Leader Question
Billy

My question at least initially revolves around seeing the world in in a new light or new way. If we begin to see the world in a new light, and it turns out that the paradigm that shifted the way we see the world was wrong, is it fundamentally possible to see the world back in the way that you originally saw it? Or how difficult is change the foundation of your way of life? Also how much exactly would it take to create a shift in the way you see the world? Would you yourself take a scientist at his word for something that you hold as a truth, or would you question it until you could see it in your own way and behold it for yourself? Why are we so willing to accept the way that science creates answers for problems that it, itself creates as the ultimate truths of the world? What possibilities are created just by simply stating something and being able to back it up with being able to answer a question you yourself created. I mean on a smaller scale, something like being adopted but never telling the kid could theoretically be a paradigm shift. That kid could grow up his whole life thinking that those were his blood relatives, only to have his whole worldview shattered when it was finally admitted to him that they weren’t. How does acceptance of that truth shatter his worldview? Rejection of the idea doesn’t seem so illogical for scientific paradigms by the elder generations when you look at it in this light. You would be telling someone who has worked in a field for decades that everything they know and how they think about their field is wrong. How are they supposed to react? What is the most important factor in creating this change or would this change truly be based on the experience of having to see it for yourself? And if everyone else is changing the way they view something does that necessarily mean that you should to? It’s like the age old adage “if your friend jumped off a bridge would you?” I think that statement applies very well in the way we look at science today. We take everything for such a literal and unquestioning answer that we sometimes forget to stop and think exactly what it is we are getting ourselves into. I guess the question to that is how many people would have to have shifted their paradigm to a particular view for you to change your view, and why would that percentage or number of people be enough to change your view?

Wes

It seems obvious now that I’ve read it, but initially Kuhn’s comment that a scientist cannot reject a paradigm without choosing a new one in the same action and remain a scientist.  This really drove home the interdependence of science and paradigm for me.  What remains unresolved for me is the role of individual perception on paradigms. 

Aside:  “Paradigm” as I’ve understood it as the thing encompassing and defining “science.”  In one of the Preface essays (X) they seem to describe Kuhn’s definition of “paradigm” to not so much be a collection of ideas shaping how we see knowledge, but a paradigm is the world and when the paradigm changes the world itself changes (obviously the world isn’t physically changing, but the paradigm is so fundamental to the way we understand the world, that our perception changes.)  Different individuals may have a different “paradigm” but if it is not the mainstream/accepted version, then they aren’t really scientists correct?

We’ve discussed how different scientists may have different rules or even interpretations of a paradigm, but Kuhn’s observation that some scientists see counterinstances where their peers simply saw puzzles troubles me.  To me this sounded more like the Halton Arp situation with a “futile” pursuit (as defined by the paradigm) as it seems that looking at anomalies in this way is to intentionally look to replace a paradigm instead of improve it.  This intentional pursuit of replacing a paradigm isn’t really an aspect of science.  I may be splitting hairs with the wording here, but the way paradigms set-up understanding and problems seems like the specificity of the set-up is important and that by looking at puzzles as counterinstances is to already have rejected the paradigm and the individual is only waiting for the next paradigm to come along to jump ship.  Does that seem like a reasonable interpretation?  Or are these individuals not really scientists at all (sitting outside the established paradigm) until the paradigm changes to include them?

Carmen

How important is it to know about previous paradigms? As Kuhn mentions and as we have experienced in school, the only thing we need to know is what is in the textbook and current formulas to get the correct answers. Should we look beyond the current paradigm because “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (150) implying that previous paradigms may have been more correct, but it just lacks supporters. Or that previous paradigm supporters are stubborn and cannot change the medium to which they look at things (gestalt).

This also relates to progress; is progress just a movement to a paradigm that is “neater, more suitable or simpler” (154) because the old stubborn men cannot oppose it anymore? They have good reason to because when accepting a new paradigm “[they] must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the old paradigm has failed a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on faith” (157). Due to a crisis in the paradigm you are required to change paradigms relying on faith, is it possible to create a new paradigm without a crisis?

According to Kuhn, new paradigms must have two qualities “must seem to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way” and “must promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors” (168). Based on this, is progress in a paradigm solving anomalies within it, or is it accepting a new paradigm that explains previous anomalies but creates new ones? Although you have a new paradigm, having to preserve a large part of the concrete problem-solving is like changing the way you look at something but it still has the same theme. Which sparks the question how different does a paradigm have to be from one other in order to change it? Compared to just changing theories within the paradigm because you have to keep the concrete problem-solving ability?

Jordan

These chapters finally satisfied me with answers to many of my previous ponderings, and still bring new questions to light: can multiple paradigms legitimately exist at once?  Based on the readings so far, the answer may not be so simple.  Using the example of electrons and orbitals, they ways in which the electrons behave can be explained in a few ways, and this behaviour can depend on the atom’s environment, proximity to other molecules, etc.  The paradigm used to explain the movement may depend on how the electrons are acting in this particular circumstance.  However, the movement of electrons always seems to be some combination of the orbital theories that are currently known, but I don’t believe that their movement is known well enough so that their random movements would be considered anomalous.  Are these paradigms that are used to describe the movement temporary/flexible until a new paradigm is discovered that more fully describes and explains the movement?  Or do these paradigms have enough ad hoc adjustments within them that they essentially explain the same thing but in different ways (what I mean by this is that paradigm 1 explains events A and B but adjusts for event C, whereas paradigm 2 explains events B and C but adjusts for event A)?  Essentially, it would not be a paradigm shift from 1 to 2, but 1 and 2 would somehow combine and shift into paradigm 3…  I assume that something like this would be possible, because when anomalies are examined they may be explained in a few ways, depending on what angle you’re looking at it from; then, when enough is known about the anomaly, and it is discovered that it behaves both this way AND that way and not one or the other, the theories can be combined to form a new paradigm.  As long as there is a viable alternative candidate to take the previous paradigm(s)’s place, it should be possible.  I suppose that the uncertainty of choosing exactly which method is right (especially is they both are) would be the crisis of science.  Kuhn’s use of the “switch of gestalt” (85) is very helpful in understanding how one paradigm can cease to be and another must take its place: it isn’t as if the thing you’re looking at goes away, or changes form–the object/substance of the image you’re looking at stays the same­–but your perspective changes when you adapt to the new paradigm.
Before I read Chapter 9, I was actually thinking of how politics would serve as a good example for explaining paradigms, their compatibility, and the rise of crises from the existing paradigms.  Take, for example, the liberal and conservative parties–on any given topic, they examine a subject based on the “liberal” or “conservative” paradigm (i.e. ethic/moral policies, various rights for humans) and they present their cases to the general public to try and sway society’s vote toward their party.  The crisis arises when the general population doesn’t agree with the major parties, and they start looking for other options that share their opinions so that, eventually, society as a whole can be reformed to reflect what matches their personal beliefs the closest.  When this happens, a revolution has occurred: the new paradigm has replaced the old one, and it was built from the ground up instead of expanding upon previous paradigms.  Is this the criteria for a revolution?  Specifically that the paradigm explains the world from an entirely new perspective rather than addressing recurring anomalies and, therefore, (not so) simply expanding upon former perspectives?  Going back to science, and contesting the “logical positivist” views, Kuhn says, “the normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often incommensurable with that which has gone before” (103).  It seems that if paradigms are to shift in this way (from 1.0 to 2.0 instead of 1.0 to 1.1), then a more thorough examination of the normal research is necessary, and views from outside of both conflicting paradigms should be taken into account.
In one of my Theology courses, we talked about the hermeneutic circle (and spiral), which is incredible cyclic in the logic of how it works.  Basically, we read a text and can understand the words individually.  But, the words are also part of a sentence, so that needs to be taken into account.  Once we understand the sentence, we can take meaning from it.  This meaning, however, can be influenced by our preconceived conceptions about the subject, and by the context of the text.  Each part of the circle affects how we understand the passage, and we can re-evaluate our understanding based on context or whatever other aspect.  The interpretation of paradigms seems similar, in that we use paradigms to make inferences about we are studying within the paradigm, and the results of that research refine our understanding of the paradigm.  Neither research nor paradigm can exist without the other.  I think progress can be explained in a similar way.  It most certainly is not a straight-line progression, and probably much more likely all over the place (like the grumble lines over comic book character’s heads).  Who is to say that though the paradigm itself may not progress, scientists working within that field won’t either?  I don’t think it would be fair to assume that.  I believe that it is important to note that progress doesn’t have to be toward anything in particular, especially from a Christian perspective.  If progress has to be marked, then that would assume there could be finite knowledge in the universe, which I don’t believe is possible.  Paradigms may give us a fuller understanding of the world, but I don’t think they are capable of capturing an infinite fount of knowledge.  After all, if there was nothing more to discover, wouldn’t that ruin the very nature of research in paradigms?

Dustin

In chapter twelve of "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" by Thomas Kuhn, we explore what remains when the dust settles after a scientific revolution. Looking at the last century, developments in physics that have attempted to reconcile general relativity with quantum theory have failed. The paradigms of both theories have grown and spread across the globe. However, one problem still remains, how do we unite both theories to have a holistic view of our universe from minuscule interactions to the gigantic forces that shift galaxies? Both relativity and quantum theory emerged from the paradigm of classical physics but appear to be entirely different. Both paradigms provide us with our highest understanding of the physical reality of our universe. When examined closely, both of these paradigms consist of some general agreements amongst smaller paradigms that exist within the large framework. In quantum theory, there are various interpretations (smaller paradigms) from which the foundation of the paradigm is born, these include the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the Copenhagen interpretation, and the Many-worlds interpretation. Relativity has gravitational time dilation, redshifting, and time delay. From what Kuhn suggests about paradigm shifts, it is apparent that we as a scientific community are on the verge of a monumental shift in thinking about physics. With both of these monstrous paradigms growing each day, it is clear we are in for one of two possibilities: quantum theory and relativity will end up being the smaller paradigms within a much greater paradigm; such as M-theory (superstring theory). Or a much darker possibility is apparent, maybe we are simply specializing our knowledge in self-contained mathematical proofs that in-essence remain useless to humanity. Perhaps, post-metaphysicians are onto something when they suggest that we as a scientific community will only continue to run ourselves in circles attempting to construct a "theory of everything." As Friedrich Nietzsche states, scientists will "see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail." As an optimist of the scientific endeavor, I hope for the former possibility and pray for the day a new flow of insights emerges from a more holistic paradigm.

Emily

On Page 171, Kuhn writes “We may have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth”. This brings up a couple big questions. The most predominant, in my mind, asks if our perception of nature is true. Are we wrong in assuming that the universe exists in some full, true, constant way of being? This is a very real possibility. Maybe science is frantically trying to move us forward to an answer that doesn’t exist? Could the master blueprint that explains how the universe works simply be wishful thinking? If it doesn’t, what is science working towards?

I don’t think that we can completely rule that idea out, but I am much more inclined to say that there is a master blueprint. The world must exist in some way of being. Whether that is evolving or staying constant we can’t know for sure, but that’s not the point. If you exist, then there must also exist the way in which you exist. If we are to assume that the world really does exist, then the world MUST exist in some manner, which we can study and try to understand. We have no measure of how accurate our current theories of nature are, they could be WAY off the way the universe actually exists. But I have trouble believing that there is no final answer. But perhaps, that’s just the way I’ve been taught to think. 

Having said that, I agree with Kuhn in saying that I’m not sure our paradigm shifts are bringing us any closer to that truth.  We can never know how wrong our old theories were until the new ones replaced them, but then, even newer ones will replace those. So it is not that much of a stretch to assume that our current theories are very wrong, and are simply waiting to be replaced by equally wrong newer theories. Progress is very funny like that.

Cacey

These last six chapters opened a lot of questions, especially fundamental questions about what the process is that Kuhn is describing after finishing the book. Mainly because it seemed that as much as parts of this book were belief shattering to me, what seemed like important points to go into for understanding his ‘scientific revolution’ structure and process didn’t get more than generalized answers and ‘I don’t knows.’ I was especially frustrated with how he dealt with how people choose which anomaly to scrutinize and also how people transition between paradigms. I understand the need for paradigms and the great potential that this is how science really works based on how in depth he went into explaining them, but in chapter eight as he went into greater detail about rejecting paradigms and exploring anomalies, he states ‘We therefore have to ask what it is that makes an anomaly seem worth concerted scrutiny, and to that question, there is probably no fully general answer.’ In later chapters he describes the choosing of paradigms as just convincing a few people that your paradigm is better, then waiting for the older scientists to die off so that your paradigm can then be established. It seems that on major things like how does an anomaly get chosen to be explored, how does a paradigm shift, how is knowledge gained? Kuhn’s answers are vague, but on other processes of science he is very specific and hard-lining on how science is really done which can seem contradictory at times. It seems that it is a very arbitrary process yet if you don’t follow it you might lose your career. So, what really is the difference between a career-ending ‘find’ and a career-making ‘find’? Is it really always as cut and dry as Halton Arp? Is there this worry that scares people into not questioning or voicing their potential anomalies because they don’t want to be end up like people like him? During times of transition is there really no science going on, no benefit to humanity or our view of nature to create? Is science really just a luck of the draw to what time you of normal science you are born in to whether or not your work will be regarded as ground-breaking or not science at all (in paradigm vs. in crisis period)? When we are trying to transition to a different paradigm is science only hindered from ‘progressing’ or ‘evolving’ because of human pride and our inability to say that we are wrong? In chapter 9, Kuhn mentions the debate between paradigms that occur and how we really question which problems are more worth pursuing, then goes on to say: “Like the issue of competing standards, that question of values can be answered only in terms of criteria that lie outside of normal science altogether, and it is that recourse to external criteria that most obviously makes a paradigm revolutionary.” What exactly are these external criteria? He never elaborates or says what they are. Just like in chapter 10 he says that normal science isn’t what corrects or changes a paradigm but never explains what actually does.

Much of the important parts of how paradigms shift: how do we choose which anomalies to explore, what changes paradigms etc. are never answered, but are always referred to as important. Finishing this book, we are left with mainly mind-bending ways on how to define the scientific process and what is involved in it – the concept of paradigms are quite interesting, but really it seems like most of this book is using and defining new words to describe something that seems to be unrevolutionary and seemingly normal. If a paradigm shift occurs by persuasion and waiting for the people who didn’t accept your theory, to die, how is this a revolution? It is a shift in thinking, but why use words like ‘revolution’ when by the time the theory is fully accepted, most people have already been hearing about it for awhile? How is this not something we already know? And if it is not something we already know, how exactly is knowing that much of the changes in thinking are not fully done by scientific process, but ‘popularity contests’, ‘waiting’ and ‘innate knowledge’ change anything about how we do science? Is it supposed to?
Trevor

One thing question that I have for Kuhn is about the definition of normal science. The definition makes sense to me, that people are working in science with problems they understand and that the paradigm is set to answer, and I get it. Normal science is expanding and testing the paradigm and we should know what we are expecting when we do experiments here, and when it doesn’t work we get anomalies and such. But one thing about science is lots of times, especially in the more technoscience fields, we are not experimenting to expand the paradigm but experimenting to make a product that we can sell and make money off. This sort of blind guess and check work doesn’t really fit with his definition of normal science, so I am just wondering where he puts it, because it is still important to the development of science. For example, we were smelting ores and making sulfuric acid long before we knew what was going on! And maybe it is not science if we just do it but I feel like this is a big part of science today. We do not really understand how some solar cells and excitions work, but we know a bit about how they act and almost work outside of the paradigm and try to make better and better products that we can sell. This is still scientific work and it drives research into these areas, but I feel like it’s not just normal science! Is there a way we can reconcile this? 

And I was a bit confused when he was talking about the verification of scientific theories on pg ,145-146, and I was wondering if you could clear that up a bit for me. Like we know that no theory can be exposed to all possible test, but what does he mean when he talks about probabilistic theories that demand the construction in imagination of all the tests that a scientific theory might be asked to pass. How can we possibly imagine all the tests? Where is the limit? He discredits these not long after he states them, but do people still believe them? Are these theories about justification credible somewhere? What is their purpose?

Maxwell I’d like to unpack the statements on Page 114 a bit – specifically the Gestalt analogy. Kuhn talks about how in a Gestalt figure, one can jump between both perspectives as correct, and he uses the examples of speaking about the change to Copernican system from the Ptolemaic system. There’s examples where there are thorough overlaps of Paradigms, where even when we call them a ‘shift’ it’s not fully a ‘shift.’ Phenomena transfer, such as gravity, from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, without needing a total overhaul of the paradigm. The shifting paradigm isn’t really a transformation I think we can analyze, but more of a slide into a new mode of thinking, dragging along pieces of the old and having those influence the new. This isn’t really a question so much as it is a critical response to the Gestalt analogy used when it comes to paradigms and paradigm shifts, but it’s what I’ve got this week!
Keshia I know this isn't going to be a very highly marked question because it's not about philosophically wrestling with his ideas in the text, but the huge question that keeps nagging at me is why does Kuhn claim that Newtonian theory comes after Einsteinian theory? Newton came before Einstein and Einstein's theories are based off of Newtonian ideas. I mean, he does express that Einstein tried to fix the claims made by Newtonian theorists who didn't supply ample research, and is it the oddity then that of all the things that Einstein was able to correct, the base ideas of Newton were incorrectable? Is that the premise? That Newton's theories would have corrected Einsteins argument against Newton's main premise if they'd emerged after Einsteinian ones? But if that were to have happened, didn't Einstein credit that he wouldn't have come to these conclusions without Newtonian theory and it's anomalies? How does this make sense in the eyes of Kuhn/science?