Leader Question
Cacey

In Kuhn, he shares a dislike for textbooks primarily because they do not inform the student of the true way that science progresses, however, there is no rejection of textbooks because they do not give good information to students on the aspects of science that they need to know to be able ‘to do science’. This is seen by the many scientists that were self-taught from reading various textbooks on a subject and later transforming science into a new belief system. However, according to ‘Personal Knowledge’ this cannot be done because the essence of what science is cannot be written down in words. This essence can only be passed down through tradition or connoisseurship as what is done from teacher to student. Because of the existence of these scientists who have greatly affected science without ever being taught by a teacher, are there certain aspects of science that maybe this scientist is lacking? Or are there only certain sciences where this can apply?
Later in the chapter, the author describes a belief system similar to what Kuhn describes as a paradigm. However, the author suggests that is impossible to know the framework that a scientist works under because he is working under it. If the author can acknowledge that there is a framework that all scientists will work under, how is it that one can become aware of what belief system they are working under? Do these belief systems or frameworks ever change as the science they are doing changes? Or is this change unobservable? To what extent are these frameworks affecting the science that is being done?

Jordan

I really like Polanyi's line in the section 2 about the fact that “there exists no rule for making fresh discoveries or inventing truer conceptions, and hence there can be no rule, either, for avoiding the uncertainty of destructive analysis” (54).  He then relays the story of the cotton spinner and the scientist, which reminded me of the “discovery” of pulmonary circulation by William Harvey–butchers at this time were well aware that if they severed an artery, the animal would bleed out significantly faster than if they cut a vein.  They, of course, did not now the physiological difference between arteries and veins, nor did they know why one exsanguinated the animal faster than the other.  It really goes to show that we can learn both by observing and by practicing.  It’s amazing to me how intertwined these types of learning are, and I doubt one can have a “full knowledge” of the subject without learning about and understanding the ways in which it operates.  Based on this quote, I wonder what Polanyi would think of Kuhn’s take on how rules work within a paradigm (namely, that there has to be some set of guidelines that dictate what is and isn’t acceptable for research in normal science).

Later on in section 5, Polanyi explains the difference between subsidiary and focal awareness.  The first thing that came to mind when I read this was throwing a ball in water polo.  I am ambidextrous, but I started learning polo skills with my right hand.  Once I had the fundamentals down, I could adjust my arm or body position in the water in order to make a better pass, and I didn’t have to think about what I was doing (subsidiary awareness).  When I injured my right shoulder and had to stop using it for a while, I started to use my left arm for throwing and turning.  It was challenging because I knew exactly what position I needed to be in, but I had to pay much more attention to actually move into that position.  I didn’t know why my body wasn’t moving like I knew it should, just that it wasn’t.  If I could just learn by observing, then I should have no issue throwing with my left hand, yes?  But obviously, that is not all there is to it, and Polanyi addresses this when he brings up art–the student must learn from the teacher by observing, but also by doing/imitating their actions.

The questions I had running through my mind throughout this chapter were essentially answered in section 8: how can we apply the concept of subsidiary vs focal awareness to less tangible things?  Going back to Kuhn, this resembles how normal science works within a paradigm; we learn some of its rules and then we use those assumptions to guide our research.  When we perform experiments, we exist within the realm of the paradigm, and we see the world through that lens.  The paradigm would be our subsidiary awareness (though we do not always realize the biases that our paradigms present), and the hypothesis we are testing would be the focal awareness.  Am I correct in comparing the two this way? 

Trevor

Polanyi states that “indefinable knowledge is an essential part of technology,” that there is a sort of art to it, that not all of any piece of technology or a tool can be fully explained by science. And I agree that for most of human history and still today that it is often the case. The idea of trade knowledge precedes understanding for example the art of smelting metal existed long before we understood what was going on, but there was this tacit, unspoken knowledge that was passed down from generations, it was more of an art. He also gave the example of the glass blowing machine that worked in Germany but its exact counterpart in Hungary could not produce a flawless piece. But as we move today into a much more technoscience world, does this still idea still apply? If we understand the science and then make technology out of the scientific understanding, does is still sum up to something more than the science behind it? Or by switching the order here do we somehow take something away from our use and experience of it?

Carmen

Where do Polanyi and Kuhn contrast with each other in their view of scientific paradigms and revolutions, and how does Polanyi view progress compared to Kuhn? One of the opening statements that Polanyi makes is that “science is operated by the skill of the scientist and it is through the exercise of his skill that he shapes his scientific knowledge” (51), this is comparable to Kuhn’s normal science, but it also implies that this normal science shapes his knowledge whereas Kuhn believes that the paradigm lays out the rules and directions and normal science is how you get to the end that is already known.

Another point that I thought was interesting is when he says, “to learn by example is to submit to authority… these hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another” (55) this view works well with Kuhn because for example, as students we learn from the textbooks, and what we are told by the people teaching us. Without being consciously aware of it, we submit to authority and tradition; Polanyi goes on to say that the “sciences rely on the transmission of skills and connoisseurship from master to apprentice” (57). With these comparisons, it can be easily seen how Polanyi and Kuhn agree on the transmission of science.

I am also wondering how the use of tools and focal versus subsidiary awareness comes into play in Kuhnian theory. Because Polanyi compares focal and subsidiary awareness to the Gestalt switch and Kuhn says that paradigm changes are like a gestalt switch, but the things you are looking at are completely different.

Paula

In chapter 4; Skills. Polanyi starts by making an emphasis in the concept or idea that science is operated in the skills of the scientists and is throughout practice that they gain the knowledge.  “the practice makes a master” is basically what I am getting from the chapter but my question is if Polanyi’s argues that “science is operated by the skill of the scientist and it is through the exercise of his skill that he shapes his scientific knowledge” how does one acquired scientific knowledge if for that you need experience? He also brings out the idea that in order achieve a “skillful” performance by observing a set of rules but, those rules are not actually known by the person how is aiming to do a skillful performance, and that is similar to what Kuhn’s view is trying to portray with the only difference that with Kuhn’s view scientists are certainly predisposed to the rules because they know them and the follow them according to what has been thought to them by their teachers. He emphasises on the idea that rules can become handy and help as a guide but only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge yet it cannot replace it. I agree with it but, as Kuhn says; the rules and theories establish a paradigm, and he also says argues that Scientifics usually have the foundations of their mentors. I am not sure if I understand where does Polanyi stand regarding the roles rules play in a skill? Because, he later, talks of how there is not rules to make new discoveries.  Polanyi also points out that; “the apprentice unconsciously picks up rules of art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself”; it is hard for me to understand what it his position in terms of rules.

Emily

Is a pianists touch a real thing? It certainly seems like it is, yet we can’t come up with an explanation as to why or how the sound differs. The note played should sound the same no matter who plays it, and yet, it doesn’t. This is a good example of the limits of modern scientific thinking. A pianists touch clearly exists, we can hear it, but there is no physical explanation for the different sound. Perhaps there is knowledge that cannot be gained through the scientific method (observation, analysis, etc), but which can only be gained through experience Science likes to reduce everything to physical phenomena. For example, your emotions are simply a physiological response to stimuli, your genes decide who you find attractive and your brain releases hormones into your bloodstream, and that is all that love is. Perhaps a pianists touch is evidence that humans, and the world in general, do not run as machines; that there IS something more to being alive and the human experience than the physical world.

What is gained through practice is more understanding than could ever be obtained through studying a book. You can know all the technical theory of how to swim, study fluid dynamics, understand the correct arm placement and breathing patterns to optimize flotation or speed. But even though you know how to swim, do you really know how to swim? Does a scientist who studies the way people move through water know how to swim better than a 10 year old who won the gold at a provincial swim meet? There is something in the experience that gives you a knowledge you cannot obtain from simply studying without participating.

It is easy to see the knowledge gained though experience when talking about a skill such as playing piano or swimming. But what about general knowledge? The Marys’ room thought experiment asks this very question. Mary is a scientist who studies color. She knows that the different wave lengths of light correspond to different colors, and how the receptors in the back of our eyes get stimulated by these wavelengths and send electrochemical signals to the brain to interoperate them. She knows everything there is to know about color, but she was born completely color blind. Even though she’s the expert on it she has never actually seen color. One day she is miraculously cured, and sees a bright red apple. Has she gained any knowledge about color? If the experience affects what we can know, how do we know our experience is accurately portraying the way things really are?

Billy

Michael Polanyi and Kuhn seem to agree on the perception for a paradigm, but each describes it in slightly different way. For Polanyi it seems to be more about tradition, in that the way you are brought up or your tradition often alters the way you see things, or your experiences of things. Whereas to Kuhn the paradigm alters the way you think about things. My question then is does Polanyi believe that process is possible? Or is he similar to that of Kuhn in that progress is not possible.  He would seem to fall under the Kuhn way of thinking; however some of his stories got me thinking he could possibly fall either way. While in one aspect he appears to say it isn’t possible, is that the apprentice learns from the master, and to learn is to “submit to authority” (pg. 55). This would appear to follow Kuhn’s thought process in that you must immerse yourself in the paradigm in order to do natural science, as the apprentice could not do the work without believing unequivocally what the master was teaching. However the other example given, the one of riding the bike makes me think to some extent progress is possible? To me when I learned how to ride a bike, it wasn’t like I just suddenly knew how to ride it, there was a training process, where I got pushed by my parents and they let go of the bike and you learn to pedal, before falling because your safety net is gone. However usually you go from training wheels, to maybe one side with training wheels, to being held while riding to finally doing it on your own. Does this mean that Polanyi would agree with Kuhn’s notion of progress or would he actually decline it and say progress is possible? Another example of this would be the progress of the doctor in connoisseurship. The doctor must hear the accentuation of the sound enough times that he can recognize it as a problem without fail. However as he learns would he not progress into learning what he is looking for, and eventually be able to learn to identify it? So essentially my question is does Polanyi believe that progress is possible?

Dustin Michael Polanyi argues that personal knowledge acquired through experience in the sciences is the force that commits practitioners to the pursuit of discovery. He uses humanities idea of love to demonstrate this notion when he says scientists are “consumed by a devotion to a universal demand.” (p. 67) This universal demand, according to Polanyi, is the search for rationality in nature. This rationality is what we search for as patterns in the natural world, however, Polanyi also notes that knowledge that appears meaningless may “... host of yet hidden implications which discovery will reveal in later days to other eyes.” (p. 67) I think that this chapter serves as an excellent complement to what we have read in Kuhn’s book, although I believe Polanyi to be gripped by the idea of our ability to obtain objectivity through science. Both Kuhn and Polanyi’s books were published around the same time, however, I find Kuhn’s analysis of experiential knowledge to be more fruitful to contemporary readers. As my group discussed during class presentations, the idea of science being able to obtain objectivity is a very powerful notion for scientists. The Nature diagram we showed titled “How Scientists Fool Themselves -- And How They Can Stop” operates under the premise that objective results are obtainable. The infographic serves an important purpose which is to identify biases in research and systematically remove them. However, I wonder at what point does research become “unbiased?” It is for these issues that I prefer the Kuhnian notions of shared cognitive values forming the basis of scientific communities as opposed to an idealist pursuit of “true” scientific objectivity. Kuhn does not offer us a solution to the notion of scientific objectivity but is strongly concerned about reconstructing how we view the relationship of scientist to the scientific endeavor. Although I prefer Kuhn’s analysis, I believe Polanyi does an excellent job in painting the picture of tacit knowledge to his audience. This type of skills or awareness is difficult to describe with words or visualizations, however, his use of pianist virtuosos, wine connoisseurs, and a host of other ideas which help establish the concept.
Stuart

In chapter 4 Polanyi discussed the “destructive analysis” of our world today. By which he means how easily we are to discredit the possibility of an event being observed “merely because we cannot understand it in terms of our hitherto accepted framework” (53). His example of this was a master pianist’s “touch”. How there is something so obviously there but isn’t in our using a recorded rationale.  We can’t teach someone to have the touch but using objective reasoning. Polanyi says a that a personal commitment is necessary to develop a skill as it “saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective” (67). For as Polanyi states “subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive” (58), and that subsidiary awareness can only be learned through experience (usually through a mentor). Polanyi talks about how the pianist needs to use both to express their “truth” of mastering the piano. Does this mean that Polanyi is a skill is required through a more personal truth then what could be ever observed in a textbook? Could that be applied to more than just a skill developing? Can a personal truth be found in something as seemingly objective as science? If there is, is it necessary to keep these two truths separate?

Wes

To be honest, I had difficulty wrapping my head around this chapter at times.  I think it was primarily due to a redefinition of terms that have a common and different meaning to me, or are rife with connotation that are unintended/incompatible with how Polanyi has used them.  An example from the Preface is the brief discussion of objectivity, (which makes me cringe a little now,) and though I recognize the validity of his definition, recent events still have me uncomfortable with the use of a term that holds connotations of claims for absolute truth.  That said, I enjoyed the Preface and Chapter 4 and found the content generally complimentary to how my views of science are being fundamentally shaped by this and other courses and discussions.  I found the section on unspecifiability interesting as it talks about the ability to do new tasks without understanding the details of how you’re doing them.  I like this description of an aspect of knowledge as it compliments the understanding I have of my discipline where, (though some may claim at truth,) much of what we do is realize something works then use it while we (or someone else) later dreams up some way of explaining it.  The jist I took from it is that it does not matter that we do not necessarily work from a foundation of established truth in science (shades of paradigm) we can still swim.  Another interesting idea was how our tools become part of us – I found this nicely ties in to how we invent tools to test explanations we make up for things we perceive.  Everything ends up interconnected in a way, which I think is more realistic to the view that everything is separable and unique.  There is a degree of scientific ability that is more than definable knowledge, which makes aspects of science more like an apprenticeship.  This is something that is built into chemistry as it is a hard science largely built on mathematics, but at the end of the day we still work in the lab and there is more art than science that goes into many lab techniques and successful implementation of theory. 

I’m not sure that reading this passage really generated any questions for me…though it whetted my appetite to read further perhaps.  An unrelated question/frustration may be with respect to our use of language and the seeming lack of rules around redefining words haphazardly to fit our purposes – an example outside of the redefinition of objectivity implied here would be the multiple multiple uses of the same contents in physics/chemistry for different things in similar contexts.