Heidegger’s “essences” seem to be another way of describing the concept that Plato labels “Forms”.  This essay is very reminiscent of Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro, in which Socrates asks Euthyphro how he defines piety; they progress through definitions, never landing on a completely satisfactory one, and the conversation is left with Socrates still seeking a proper definition of piety.  In the same way, Heidegger does not land on a definition for technology that fully encompasses all that it is.  I think it’s interesting that Heidegger references Aristotle (on pg7) and the doctrine of the four causes (and its relation to some of technology’s goals), but nowhere does he make comparisons with his essences to Plato’s Forms.  He does mention the Greeks and their ways of thinking on multiple occasions, so maybe he is just attributing the concept of Forms to have originated from a more general place [side note: I don’t mean to imply that Heidegger does not reference Plato, he does actually, just not his concept of Forms]…  One of Heidegger’s definitions of technology–that it is a way of revealing truth–is perplexing to me, particularly with respect to some of our previous readings.  Coming from Kuhn’s perspective that science cannot lead us to Capital T Truth–or, as I understand it, an absolutely complete understanding of a concept (the essence/Form of something, if you will)– Heidegger’s statement that technology, a type or means of science, is capable of revealing Truth, would be moot.  I suppose this leads me to my question: Heidegger says that Truth can be revealed through technology, Polanyi says that Truth can be arrived at by mechanistic means, and Kuhn says that we can never be sure of Truth; might this be indicative that we are trying to describe the essence/Form of Truth?  I think it is.  Each of the definitions by themselves are not quite satisfactory or encapsulating to everyone trying to define Truth (hence these fellow’s different ideas about what Truth is), and Truth is one of those things that not everyone agrees upon. 

Correct me if I am wrong, but what I got from the Heidegger reading was that old crafting and technology were a way of bringing things into use, sort of a bringing forth of the objects purpose, his problem with and technology today is that we are sort of chasing things down, doing everything for profit, challenging nature. And this view of the world limits our ways of knowing truth, and science is the only form of revealing we perceive as useful. What challenges me the most is when he starts talking about Ge-stell or enframing. What does he mean by this? And if it is the idea that technology enframes more than its parts, how does it add to the argument?

By way of a convoluted and dreary path, Heidegger draws the reader’s heavy eyelids across the pages to the idea that, so called, enframing is the essence of technology, or more accurately that the essence of technology lies in enframing, and enframing belongs in the destining of revealing.  If you don’t know how we got to revealing or the complexity and depth of the rabbit hole down which we must have fallen to get here, read the book.  I had to. 
It is in the destining of enframing where he identifies the danger, and in two forms.  There is the danger that humanity could be relegated to the unfortunate status of a standing-reserve.  This is eerily reminiscent of The Matrix.  Alternatively, Heidegger suggests that humanity is in danger, at the hand of the misguided destining of enframing, of perceiving himself as lord of the earth.  This, by contrast to the other, seems eerily accurate of current pace at which we are exploiting our planet. 
Perhaps most jarring is the statement that humanity might fail, under these circumstances, to see themselves as the ones spoken to.  Andy Crouch, former IS keynote tells in his book “Playing God” how all idols seem to follow a similar path.  They begin by promising great things and requiring very little in return.  Gradually, they ask more and more while giving less and less until they ask the ultimate price and give nothing in return.  God, he explains, created us to flourish and idols seek to smother us.  If I am understanding Heidegger, and the most likely answer is that I am not, does his description of the dangers of losing the reigns of the destining of the enframing of the revealing of nature as the chief storehouse of source of our flourishing amount to the suggestion that, left unchecked, technology, as it were, is the idol of today?  Because, if we are failing to see ourselves as the one spoken to –– by this temptress called technology –– then, is the idol of technology whispering sweetly in our ear, demanding more and more, yet offering ever less and less?

P.S. My spell check agrees with me.  Enframing is not a word.  Neither is presencing. 

My question for this week revolves is the four causes, and whether there is the possibility of more causes to be found? I understand the concept that there must be a material, you must shape it, for some means, and that whoever shapes it is the fourth cause. But could there technically not be more causes then just this simple four. My example of a possible fifth cause would be accidental, or unanticipated cause. That is to say that something that you did or did not intend to make the way you shaped it, and it meets and doesn’t meet you end, but it does meet a different end then the one that you were attempting to create. Example of this would be the legend of how a chocolate chip cookie was first invented. The initial attempt was in adding the chocolate chips to a cake mix, in order to melt and turn the batter into a chocolate brown. Would this be an example of a cause that while accidental and not necessarily shaped the way you were attempting to shape it, be an example of a fifth form of causality? Or would this still fall under the four causes of causality? And why is it so defined that there can only be four causes or is there more than four causes in causality to this day?

Heidegger describes technology has a means to an end and a human activity, where instead it should be considered more of an art. I agree that we think of technology as a way of getting things done faster and more efficient. But in the correct context I do not think that looking at technology this way is a bad thing. Humans have created technology to better their lives whether that be a vehicle, or a fridge or the internet; these technological advances has helped humanity. Technology can be used as an evil if used to create things that no longer help people with their daily lives for example weapons of destruction. In that way, we should be questioning technology and the uses for it. Heidegger also describes technology as being a “human activity” because only humans are able to create technology, does he mean that we do it only to benefit us? And how do we look at and create technology in an artistic way that isn’t for strictly for a means to an end?
Another question I have is what exactly is Enframing, how is it dangerous and how are we able to avoid it?

   For physical sciences, technology is an essential aspect of our disciplines. In a technoscientific age, these instruments allow us the ability to reveal knowledge about our universe that would otherwise be inaccessible. We use chemical constructs which are metaphysical by nature alongside technology. This allows humanity the tools to ponder, explore, and transform the world around us. This enables scientists to have a positive connotation when associating with the word technology. However, when a scholar of history reflects on the atrocities of the past it is difficult not to be cautious of the promises we ascribe to technology. Our relationship with technology is constantly in flux. As time goes on, our technologies evolve consistently without much consideration on our behalf into the nature of this relationship. Our weapons are becoming increasingly powerful, our computers process information in the blink of an eye, and through integration, our lives have begun to merge into a structure that revolves around a technoscientific world. However, Martin Heidegger offers us a key insight into the mystery that shrouds the concept of technology.  Heidegger explores how the meaning of technology has morphed throughout the course of history. He explains that we can never truly pinpoint the essence of technology but we can help define what we mean by the word. For him, we have two definitions in regards to technology, the instrumental and the anthropological. The instrumental definition is tied up with our teleological approach to how we can use technology. He highlights Aristotelian notions of causality to help readers explore this idea. The anthropological definition is in regards to how we view technology as a human activity. For Heidegger, both help to clarify what we mean by technology but fail at helping us grasp the foundational essence regarding technology. This essence, however, has nothing to do with technology. The essence has everything to do with revealing. He states that this revealing is an attempt to reveal what lies beneath, which to Heidegger is truth. Therefore, the question that concerns technology is the question of truth. However, this relationship between truth and revealing is ambiguous and our rational approach to the truth will lead us astray. Heidegger offers a solution to this issue, he explains that an artistic approach to these questions will yield a better understanding of the essence of technology. I believe this notion is helpful for contemporary readers. With our lives becoming contingent on modern technoscience, we require an approach that focuses less on the definitions of technology and attempts to inquire about the essence regarding technology. Ideally, this will help establish a future in which technology aids in affirming life and not merely as a means to an end.  

I found this text seemed to be unnecessarily complicated - though often aesthetically pleasing at times and even poetic - I don’t think the complex language adds value to the piece beyond what the lack of clarity takes away?  An example that I found to be as intriguing as it was confusing is:

“When we look into the ambiguous essence of technology,
we behold the constellation, the stellar course of the mystery.” (p.33)

I genuinely appreciate this from an aesthetic perspective – but it is over-complicated and less-useful as a result.  Even the careful definition of terms used could be unclear and seemed to jump around.  Throughout the essay the reader has to work to understand the language, then work to follow the progression of the argument, before they can even begin to engage with the piece (I don’t think this is bad persay, and it may not have been as problematic for others who have read similar styles of writing more frequently than I, but there is definitely room for improvement here from an accessibility of information POV.)

My question may be a product of this misunderstanding of the text, but I don’t know that I followed how the following statement is supported/justified…

But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.
(quote of Hölderlin, p.28)

I’m not sure that I follow the logic of requiring there to be the ability/opportunity to save coming from danger?  I can partially follow how this is true in the discussion of enframing and technology, but am uncomfortable with the implied universality of the power to save being wrapped up in the danger itself.

In Heidegger’s essay he mentions the “supreme danger” of technology.  On the ways that Heidegger mentioned was that in the age of technology people think that the use of technology is the Gold standard of objectiveness and uses the example of how people think exact physical science (with measurable absolutes) is the same as applied physical science. Heidegger worries that this will weaken our critical thinking and won’t “enframe” us (if I’m using that word correctly) to pursue deeper questions. My question is this already happened in other aspects in our lives? Like in politics, law, or the social norms of our society? Have we become too comfortable with somethings in our society that we fail to see their faults.
Also Heidegger defines technology as a “means to an end” or “a human activity” So could you clarify what Heidegger means by this?

Throughout the first section of Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, he uses the term “essence of technology.” He gives a definition of it and many examples of the term and those associated with it. He talks about how “[a]ccording to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is” (4); so does that mean that the “essence of ‘tree’” (4) refers to the tree as just being an object or does it mean something more? Heidegger talks about how “we have to become aware that That which pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree.” (4). In this quote it seems to me that Heidegger is saying that if someone believes a tree is in fact a tree, he himself is not a tree, which makes sense.
Later on in the first chapter, Heidegger discusses modern technology and earlier technologies. He talks about how “modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science” (14). This brings up another point that Heidegger makes regarding “modern science [being] too … revealing” (14). According to him “[t]echnology is a way of revealing … [and through] giv[ing] heed to [it], another realm for the essence of science will open itself up to us” (12). While technology/science is useful for daily life, it can be dangerous. The more that people learn about technology, the more that modern science will reveal itself. This will drive people to find every method/way to discover new information. Soon enough this may result in people becoming too caught up in information that they forget to live their lives.
My questions for this section is: according to Heidegger, what is the essence of technology and what is a simpler and more straightforward definition of it? Regarding the “essence of tree” does Heidegger mean that the tree is just an object or is it something more? (This is the question from my first paragraph). This section was very difficult for me to understand and I am unsure if my thoughts are correct with what he is talking about.

Through reading Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” I had a really tough time reading through the section of Technology As a Means to an End. Heidegger continuously mentions “Enframing”. He described Enframing as The call or demand that gathers man "to order the self-revealing nature as standing-reserve" (19) Heidegger also says That “the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing”. But my question would be how is modern technology not physical science? And what does Heidegger mean when he refers to the real revealing itself as standing reserve? And I don’t really understand how he goes on to describe technology in two ways being “a means to an end” as well as “ a human activity”. So when Heidegger mentions the free relationship and Enframing. Does he mean that we as humanity need to separate ourselves from technology? Like does technology need to be “stand alone” and a “standing reserve”?

In Heidegger’s attempt to understand the essence of technology, is he looking for the ultimate idea of what constitutes the underlying idea of what technology fundamentally is? He says, “technology is not the equivalent to the essence of technology” and is something that “ is by no means anything technological” (4). Sandwiched between these two lines is a description of a tree and how each type of tree has a similar essence. He seems to be gleaning ideas out of Plato’s philosophy of forms. Ultimately Heidegger appears to be attempting to understand the ultimate meaning of what technology is. And it seems a little hazy to me as to what that is. He says “the essence of modern technology shows itself in what we call Enframing” (23), but this concept was quite unclear to me. If it is “the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-reserve” (23), is he saying that the ultimate essence of technology is it’s ability to maintain it’s status as a means to an end in the culmination of all it’s parts together even when it is not in use? Is it the very real possibilities it creates by simply existing in order to fulfill destined purpose? Is this idea of essence contained in its ability to maintain a controlled usefulness? Does it cease to be a technology if we no longer control it?
“In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command” (16).
But what if we were no longer able to command the Rhine? In our ability to control technology, and it’s ability to designate (and in some ways predestine ideas), are we not confronted with the Kuhnian problem that technology created and controlled for specific purposes will only outline the predicted outcome as they were made to? If we make technologies, and control them, for a specific purpose do we not run the risk of not revealing ultimate truth? Heidegger ultimately wants to look for the ultimate truth of technology, yet also tries to maintain that we are given truth through technology because of it’s perceived ability to reveal as is the implication of the thoughts throughout page 33. If we weren’t able to control technology and it’s ultimate end or purpose would we be able to truth that unbiased ends could be met? That the ends would solidify truth because the means is no longer slave to our disposal?

The distinction between Bringing forth and Challenging Forth in the context of understanding truth is important, and Heidegger does an excellent job demonstrating the differences in The Question Concerning Technology. We are at a place right now where Heidegger would say we are fully immersed in Challenging Forth. The threat of challenging forth is that it suppresses some of the better truths we could discover in Bringing Forth. Heidegger uses the example of a silver chalice, and how it comes to be. Fundamentally, it’s created, or brought forth not because it was made to hold drink, but that it was made because it IS that which holds drink. However, with this being steeped in Greek traditionalism, Socratic forms come to mind, as well as a certain movie (the gods must be crazy). Demonstrating all the various uses for a coke bottle that falls from an airplane in an unconventional sense – I’m confused if this contradicts Heideggers point or if it confirms it. Was the coke bottle created because it IS that which cracks walnuts? Or that it IS that which starts fires? Or, is it considered part of the natural environment, and is not considered a created product in that sense? If everything is a technology, certain technologies are then perhaps found in their already completed state. I would like further clarification, and further thoughts on the ideas expressed here, as it seems to be a bit of a rabbit trail Heidegger doesn’t clearly nail down for me.